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volved are tersely and withal fairly stated in
argument by-the distinguished counsel for
the plaintiff Commonwealth, lon. David
Dudley Field, as follows: "1. Can a State of
the Union implead another State, in this
court, for a money demand? 2. Can it do so,
when the demand has been assigned to it by one
of its citizens for the purpose of the suit? 3.
Can it do so, as the sovereign and trustee of the
citizen, without an assignment of his demand?
4. If a suit against the State itself could not
be maintained in the case supposed, could the
officers of the State of Louisiana, under the
circumstances of this case, be required, by
the judgment of this court, to apply the
money in their hands to the payment of in-
terest on the bonds? 5. And if the money
on hand be sufficient to pay the interest now
due, can the officers be furthermore directed
to go on in the execution of their oflices, and
assess and collect the taxes required by the
Constitution and laws of 1874, and pay the
arrears of interest out of the same?" When
the case is decided, we shall take pains to give
our readers the earliest practicable report, or
('if of great length), resume of the opinion.
GIFTS CAUSA MORiS.
Justinian, in describing a donatio mortis
causa, says that it is "when the donor wishes
that the thing given should bel6ng to hitnself
rather than to the person to whom he gives
it, and to that person rather than to his own
heir." 1 In illustration of which he cites the
words which Homer puts into the mouth of
Telemachus when the latter gives to Pirceus:
"Pirous, for we know not how these things
shall be, whether the proud suitors shall se-
cretly slay me in the palace, and shall divide
the Aoods of my father. I would that thou
thyself shouldst have and enjoy these things
rather than that any of those men should;
but if I shall plant slaughter and death
amongst those men, then indeed bear these
things to my home, and joying give them to
me in joy."
Gifts causa mortis have not been generally
favored in the law. It is now more than a
hundred-years since Lord Chancellor Hard-
1 Sandars' Justinian (Hamnond's ed.), 218,
wicke declared it to be a pity that the statute
for the prevention of frauds and perjuries did
not set aside all such gifts. 2 A donatio mor-
tis causa was required by the law of Justinian
to be made in the presence of five witnesses. 3
But the common law does not require the
gift to be executed in the presence of any
stated number of witnesses, notwithstanding
the fact that such donations amount to a re-
vocation pro tanto of written wills.' As they
lack all those formalities and safeguards
which the law, in its wise precaution, throws
around wills, it can nct be denied that a
strong temptation is created to the commis-
sion of fraud and perjury. Such gifts are,
therefore, said by Chancellor Kent in the note
last cited, to be "of a dangerous nature."
"Cases of this kind demand the strictest
scrutiny. So many opportunities, af.d such
strong temptations," says Lord Chelmsford,
present themselves to unscrupulous persons
to pretend these death bed donations, that
there is always danger of having an entlrely
fabricated case set up. And, without any
imputation of fraudulent contrivance, it is so
easy to mistake the meaning of persons lan-
guishing in a mortal illness, and by a slight
change of words, to convert their expressions
of intended benefit into an actual gift of prop-
city, that no case of this description ought.
to prevail, unless it is supported by evidence
of the clearest and most unequivocal charac-
ter." 5 Such gifts are never presumed, and
the maxim is applied, nemo donarejacile prae
sumitur. Such gifts 'must be established
beyond suspicion ;,,6 and "where a gift causa
mortis is alleged, the presumption being
against it, clear proof on the part of the
claimant is required." '7  And there is no
doubt that they have been "a fruitful source
of litigation, often bitter, protracted and ex-
pensive."
s
Now, a donatio moi'tis causa is delined to
be a conditional gift, depending on the con-
tingency of expected death, and defeasible
by revocation, or deliverance from the peril.9
2 Ward v. Turner, 2 Ves. 431, 437 (1752).
3 Sandars' Justinian (Haimond's ed.) 219.
4 2 Kent's Corn. 444.
5 Cosnahan v. Grice, 15 Moore P. C. 215, 223.
( Grey v. Grey, 47 TN. Y. 552, 556.
7 Conklin v. Conklin, 20 Hun, 278, 280. See, also,
Walter v. Hodge, 2 Swans. 97; Contant v. Schuyler,
1 P~aige, 316.
8 Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Me. 326.
P Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wharton, 17.
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And the rule is that in order to render perfect
a donatio mortis causa three things must con-
cur :10 1. The gift must be made with a view
to the donor's death. 2. It must be made
with a condition, either express or implied,
that it shall take effect only on the death of
the donor by a disease from which he is then
suffering. 3. There must be a delivery of the
subject of the donation.
While it is essential that the dono0 make
the gift in his last illness, or in contempla-
tion or expectation of immediate death," yet
it is not necessarythat it should be made in
extremis like a nuncupative will. 12 Where a
citizen of Tennessee, on leaving his home in
Tennessee to enlist in the Federal army in
Kentucky, delivered money and notes to be a
.gift to the donee in case he perished in the
war, it was held that the peril and apprehen-
sion were sufficiently immediate to justify a
gift causa mortis. 13 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court of New York has held that
the delivery of a promissory note, by a person
about entering the army, to his brother, with
directions to give it to his mother should he
not return alive, was not a valid gift to the
mother."' And where a gift was made in ex-
pectation of immediate death from consump-
tion, wnd the donor afterwards recovered so
far as to attend to his ordinary business for
eight months, and then finally died from' the
same disease, the court held that the gift
could not be supported as a donatio mortis
causa.15 The expectation or apprehension of
death may arise from infirmity or old age, or
from external and anticipated danger. 16
10 Taylor v. Henry, 48 Md. 550; Murray v. Cannon,
41 Md. 466; Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Smith v.
Kittridge, 21 Vt. 238; French v. Raymond, 39 Vt.
623; Blanchard v. Sheldon, 16 Vt. 266; Raymond v,
Sellick, 10 Conn. 484.
11 Lawson v. Lawson, 1 P. W. 441; Miller v. Miller,
S P. W. 358; Blount v. Burrows, 1 Vesey, Jr. 546;
Cosnahan v. Grice, 15 Moore P. C. 215, 222; Grattan v.
Appleton, 3 Story C. C. 755; Gourley v. Linzhigler, 51
Pa. St. 345; Rhodes v. Childs, 64 Pa. St. 18; Robin-
son v. Ring, 72 Ale. 144; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. 1. 88;
Gass v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 288; Chaplin v.
-Seeber, 56 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 46; Irish v. Nutting, 47
Barb. (N. Y.) 370; Sheldon v. Button, 5 Hun, (N. Y.)
110; Merchant v. Merchant, 2 Bradf. (N. Y.) 432;
Barker v. Barker, 2 Gratt. (Va.) 344; Sheegog v. Per-
kins, 4 Baxter (Tenn.), 273; Knott v. Hogan, 4 Met.
(Ky.) 101.
12 Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wharton (Penn.), 17; Gass
,v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 288.
13 Gass v. Simpson, supra.
14 Sheldon v. Button, 5 Hun. 110.
loWeston v. Hight, 17 -Me. 289.
i6 Dig. 39, 6, see. 3, 4, 5, 6; 2 Kent's Corn., 444.
That delivery of the gift is essential, is a
principle established by a long line of deci-
sions, and disputed by none. 17 But it is not
necessary that the delivery should be to the
donee personally, it may be made to a third
person in his behalf.' 8 And instead of de-
livering the gift to the donee or to a third
person in trust for him, the donor may create
himself a trustee for the donee. As where
money is deposited in bank in the name of
the donor as trustee for the donee, and a pass
book, is received containing an entry that the
funds are in trust. In such case there may
be a valid gift, although the cestui que trust
possesses no knowledge of the trust, and al-
though the pass book is in the donor's posses-
sion until death. 19 The acceptance of the
gift by the donee is also essential in order to
make a gift complete or perfect.2 o But ac-
ceptance may be presumed in cases where it
would be beneficial to the donee.21 And in
general any gift by dead, will, or otherwise,
is supposed primafacie, unless the contrary
appears to be beneficial to the donee.2 2 Not
only must there be a delivery of the gift, a
change of possession, but this change of pos-
session must be continued in the donee, or in
17 Ward v. Turner, 2 Vesey, 431; Tate v. Hilbert, 2
Vesey, Jr. 111; Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunton, 224;
Powell v. Hellicar. 26 Beavan, 261; Gough v. Tindon,
8 E. L. & Eq. 507; Drury v. Smith, 1 P. W. 404;
Resch v. Senn, 28 Wis. 286; Carpenter v. Dodge,20
Vt. 595; Frost v. Frost, 33 Vt. 639; Turner v. Brown,
6 Hun, 333; Cox v. Sprigg, 6 Md. 274; Powell v. Leon-
hard, 9 Fla. 359; Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88;
Egerton v. Egerton, 2 C. E. Green, 419; Dow v
Gould, etc. Man. Co., 31 Cal. 629; Smith v. Wiggins,
3 Stew. (Ala.) 221; Singleton v. Cotton, 23 Ga. 261;
McKenzie v. Downing, 25 Ga.669; Hatch v. Atkinson,
56 Me. 324; Young v. Young, 80 N. Y. 422; Brown v.
Brown, 18 Conn. 414, 417; Phipps v. Hlope, 16 Ohio
St. 586; Craig v. Craig, 3 Barb. Ch. 76; Champlin v.
Seeber, 56 How. Pr. 46; Waring v. Edmonds, 11 Md.
424; People v. Johnson, 14 Ill. 342; Withers v.
Weaver, 10 Barr, 391.
15 Drury v. Smith, I P. W. 404: Caldwell v. Ren-
frew, 33 Vt. 213; Jones v. Dever, 16 Ala. 221; McGil-
licuddy v. Cook, 5 Blackf. 178; Michener v. Dale, 23
Pa. St. 59; Gourley v. Linsenbigler, 51 Pa.- St. 345;
Wells v. Tucker, 5 Binney, 366; Grymes v. Hone, 49
N. Y. 17; Borneman v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429, 431;
Dole v. Lincoln, 31 Me. 422; Waring v. Edmonds, 11
Md. 424; Gass v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 288.
19 Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134, and the cases there
cited.
20 Delmotte v. Taylor, 1 Redf. 417; Dow v. Gould,
etc. Manuf. Co., 31 Cal, 629; DeLevellain v. Evans, 39
Cal. 120; Armitage v. Widoe, 36 Mich. 124.
21 Goss v. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.), 67; DeLevel-
lain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120; Higman v. Stewart, 38
Mich. 513, 524; Darland v. Taylor, 52 Iowa, 503.
. 22 Gos sv. Singleton, 2 Head (Tenn.), 67.
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a third person for him, until the donor's
death.
23
Although a difference of opinion at one
time existed as to what could be the subject
of a gift causa mortis, the principles deter-
mining the question are now well settled. A
donatio causa mortis extends only to person-
alty, and a gift of real estate can not be sus-
tained as such a gift.21 In Pennsylvania the
courts have held that the gift of all aperson's
property to take effect after death, was not a
valid donatio causa mortis, that a gift Causa
mortis could not thus be made to operate as
a will, 25 though the same court, in a subse-
quent case, has held that the rule is otherwise
as to a particular chattel, although such chat-
tel may have constituted the principal part of
the donor's property. 26 But it has been held
in Vermont that there is no principle of lim-
itation as to the amount of property which
may be transferred by a donatio causa mortis,
and it was held a valid gift where the donor,
on his death bed, executed a deed of all his
personal property to his wife.2 It was for-
merly held that a mere chose in action did not
pass by delivery, and could not take effect as
a gift causa mortis.2s But such is no longer
the rule, and it is well settled that a promis-
sory note made by a third person, and paya-
ble to the order of the donor, or a bill of ex-
change may be a valid gift causa morris.
29
But the donor's own promissory note is not
the subject of such a gift.30 Such a note is
23 Hatch v. Atkinson, 56 Mc. 324; Jones v. Deyer, 16
Ala. 221.
24 Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591; Gilmore v. White-
sides, Dudley (S. C.), 13.
25 Headley v. Kirby, 18 Pa. St. 826.
26 Michener v. Dale, 23 Pa. St. 59.
72 Meach v. Meach, 24 Vt. 591.
28 Miller v. Miller, 3 P. W. 358; Bradley v. Hunt, 5
Gill & J. 54.
29 Austin v. Mead, 15 L. R. Ch. Div. 651; Veal v.
Veal, 27 Beavan, 303; Rankin v. Weguelin, Id. 309,
Caldwell v. Renfrew, .88 Vt. 213; McConiell v. Mc-
Connell, 11 Vt. 290; Turpin v. Thompson, 2 Metc.
(Ky.) 421; Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn. 414, 417; Borne-
man v. Sidlinger, 15 Me. 429; Wing v. Merchant, 57
Me. 388; Grover v. Grover, 24 Pick. 261; Bates v.
Kempton, 7 Gray, 882; Parker v. Marston, 27 Me.196;
Contant v. Schuyler, 1 Paige, 316; Harris v. Clark, 2
Barb. 94; s. c., 3 . Y. 93; Champney v. Blanchard,
39 N. Y. 111.
30 Blanchard v. Williams, 70 Ill. 647, 652; Parish v.
Stone, 14 Pick. 198; Priester v. Priester, Rich. Eq.
Cas. 26; Brown v. Moore, 8 Head (Tenn.), 671; Ray-
mond v. Sellick, 10 Conn. 484; Smith v. Kitttidge, 21
Vt. 238; Voorhees v. Woodhull,33 N. J. Law, 494, 498;
Smith v. Smith, 30 N. J. Eq. 562; Haymore v. Moore,
8 Ohio St. 239; Starr v. Starr, 9 Ohio St. 74; Craig
a mere promise of the donor, and can no more
be recovered upon as a gift, than could a re-
covery be had upon- the unwritten promise of
the donor. Such notes "are of no more value
than blank paper," for a mere intention or
naked promise to give is not a gift, and a
court of equity will not interfere and give ef-
fect to a gift left inchoate and imperfect.
3
And if the promissory note of a third person
be given causa mortis, and be secured by a
mortgage, the mortgage will enure solely to,
the benefit of the donee, although the mort-
gage deed was not deliered with the note, or
even alluded to at the time of the delivery of
the note, but continued to remain in the do-
nor's possession until his death.3 2 It is also
settled that it is entirely unnecessary that the
note should be indorsed in order to pass the
title.33 So a bond may be given without any
written assigment.34 And the delivery of a
certificate of deposit on a life insurance com-
pany has been held to be effectual, without a
written assignment, to transfer the deposit it-
self to the donee, as a gift causa mortis.
35 A
deposit in a savings bank may be the subject
of a valid gift causa mortis, and such gift
may be proved by the delivery of the bank
or pass book to the donee, accompanied by
an assignment; 36 or it may be proved by the
simple delivery of the pass book, without any
assignment.3 7 It has been held that the de-
livery of a banker's deposit note may be a
good gift causa mortis.3s In Curry v. Pow-
ers, recently decided in the New York Court
of Appeals, it was held that the delivery of a
check upon a savings bank, payable four
days after the death of the drawer, together
with the pass book of the depositor, did not
v. Craig, 8 Barb. Ch. 76; Harris v. Clark, 3 N. Y. 93;
Dodge v. Pond, 23 N. Y. 69; s. c., 28 Barb. 121.
81 2 Kent's Com., 338; Antrobus v. Smith, 12 Ves.
39; Pennington v. Gittings, 2 Gill & J. 208.
32 Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn. 414, 417.
33 See the cases cited in note 29.
34 Waring v. Edwards, 11 Md. 424; Walsh v. Sex-
ton, 55 Barb. 251 ; Duffield v. Elwes, 27 Beavan, 309.
35 Waterloo v. DeWitt, 36 N. Y. 340.
36 Kingman v. Perkins, 105 lMass. 111; Foss v. Low-
ell Five Cents Savings Bank, 111 Mass. 285. Sheedy
v. Roach, 124 Mass. 472; Davis v. Ney, 125 Mass. 590.
87 Pierce v. Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, 129
Mass. 425; Turner v. Boston, etc. Savings Bank, Ib.
425; Hill v. Stevenson, 63 Me, 364; Tillinghast v.
Wheaton, 8 R.I. 536; Camp's Appeal, 36 Conn. 88;
Penfield v. Thayer, 2 E. D. Smith, 805.
S8 Amis v. W!tt, 33 Beavan, 619; Moore v. Moore,
L. R. 18 Eq. 474; Brooks v. Brooks, 12 S. C. (N. S.)
424.
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amount to a valid gift causa mortis. 39 And
in the English case of Hewitt v. Kaye,
40
where a check given by the drawer was not
presented for payment until after the death
of the donor, it was held not to amount to a
good donatio mortis causa. But in Rolls v.
Pearce, where a check was drawn by a donor
payable to his wife or her order, and was
given to him by her shortly before his death,
was indorsed by her and paid into a foreign
bank against the amount of which she drew,
the court held it to be a good don'tio mortis
causa, although the check was not presented
for payment at the bank on which it was
drawn till after the death of the donor.
41
The delivery of a bill of exchange payable to
the donor or order, and which did not fall due
until after he died, has been held a gift causa
mbrtis.
42
A distinction, therefore, exists as to
checks, and the principle is, that although
the drawer of the check may deliver it to the
payer, intending thereby to give to the donee
the fund on which the check was drawn,
that, nevertheless, until the check has been
paid or accepted the gift is incomplete, and
that, in the absence of either payment or ac-
ceptance, the death of the drawer operates
as a revocation of the gift.43 The rule then,
is, that personal chattels, bonds or choses in
action, may be the subject of disposal as
gifts, either inter vivos or causa mortis,44 but
that a donor's own promissory note can not
be so disposed of, and that a check which he
has drawn and given to the payee, must be
either paid or accepted before the donor's
death, to make the gift valid and complete.
While personal property is thus the subject
of gifts causa mortis,, as above stated, yet the
rule is that the only property which can thus
be disposed of, is the balance left after the
payment of all debts. Or, in other words,
the donee takes the property, subject to the
right of the administrator to reclaim it, if re-
quired for the payment of the debts of the
donor, 45 but not to the claims of lega-
39 70 N. Y., 212.
40 L. R., 6 Eq., 198.
41 L. R. 5'Ch. Div. 730.
42 Austin v. Mead, L. R. 15 Ch. Div. 651.
43 Second National Bank v. Williams, 13 Mich. 282;
Simmons v. Savings Society, 31 Ohio St. 457.
4 Blanchard v. Williams, 70 Ill. 647, 652.
45Pierce v. Boston Savings Bank, 129 Mass. 425,
433; Mitchell v. Pease, 7 Cush 350; Chase v. Redding,
tees. 46 So, by the civil law, such gifts were lia-
ble to debts. If the donor was insolvent at
the time of his death, this was considered an
implied revocation of the gift. 4-
We have stated that delivery is essential to
complete a gift causa mortis. It remains,
however, to direct attention to what is a suf-
ficient delivery of the property, which is the
subject of the gift, to satisfy the require-
ments of the law upon this branch of the sub-
ject. For while the maxim "donatio perfici-
tur possessione accipientis" is an ancient one
in the law, it has not always been easy to de-
termine what is a sufficient possession of the
property to perfect the title of the donee.
This question of delivery was elaborately con-
sidered and learnedly discussed by Lord
Chancellor Hardwicke in Ward v. Turner,
4s
in the year 1752. In the course of the opin-
ion announced by the chancellor, he said: "It
is %rgued that, though some delivery is neces-
sary, yet delivery of the thing is not neces-
sary, but delivery of any thing by way of
symbol is sufficient; but I can not agree to
that; nor do I find any authority for that in
the civil law, which required delivery to some
gifts, or in the law of England which required
delivery throughout. Where the civil law re-
quires it, they require actual tradition, deliv-
ery over of the thing. So in all the cases in
this court delivery of the thing given is relied
on, and not in the name of the thing.",
While thus holding that delivery should be
actual and not symbolical, he adds that "de-
livery of the key of bulky goods, where
wines, etc., are, has been allowed as delivery
of the possession, because it is the way of
coming at the possession, or to make use of
the thing; and, therefore, the key is not a
symbol, which would not do." The point
actually decided was, that the delivery of re-
receipts for certain South Sea annuities did
not amount to a delivery of the annuities.
Subsequently this subject was discussed, and
with marked learning, in Tate v. HUbert,
49
when Lord Loughborough again urged the ne-
cessity of actual delivery to the efficacy of gifts
13 Gray, 418; McLean v. Weeks, 67 Me. 277; s. c., 65
Me. 411; Gaunt v. Tucker, 18 Ala. 27; Borneman v.
Sidhnger, 15 Me. 429, 431; House v. Grant, 4 Lans.
296.
46 Gaunt v. Tucker. 88 Ala. 27.
47 Sandars' Justinian (Hammond's ed.) 219.
4S 2 Vesey, 431, 443.
49 2 Vesey Jr. 111.
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of this nature,unless the transfer was perfected
by means of a deed or written instrument.
He decided that where a person, in his last
sickness, gave his check on his banker for a
sum of money, and died before the check was
paid, it was not a good gift causa mortis, and
that where the same person, at the same time,
gave his own promissory note for a sum of
money to another donee, that it was not good
as such a gift, inasmuch as it was no trans-
fer of property. It is settled that there must
be such a delivery as comports with the nature
of the subject matter.50 The delivery should
be secundum subjectam mater'am. It should
" be the true and effectual way of
obtaining the command and dominion
of the subject.' 'b1 The rule is well stated in
a case decided in Virginia, where it is said:
"A delivery is indispensable to the validity of
a donatio mortis causa. It must be an actual
delivery of the thing itself, as of a watch or a
ring; or of the means of getting the posses-
sion and enjoyment of the thing, as of the
key of a trunk or a warehouse in which the
subject of the gift is deposited; or if the
thing be in action of the instrument by using
which, the chose is to be reduced into posses-
sion, as a bond, or a receipt, or the like."
52
The fact that the property is out of reach of
the would-be donor, so that delivery is im-
possible, is entirely immaterial, the gift can
not be sustained in the absence of a delivery,
whether delivery is possible or not. 53 In il-
lustration of the principles d-Ecassed, a ref-
erence to a few of the cases may not be out
of place. In Hatch v. Atkinson, 54 the court
held that the delivery of a key of a trunk
containing money and government bonds, was
not a valid delivery of the money and bonds.
"Although delivery of the key of a ware-
house, or other place or deposit," said the
court, "where cumbrous articles are kept,
may 'constitute a sufficient constructive or
symbolical delivery of such articles, it is well
settled that delivery of the key of a trunk,
50 Turner v. Brown, 6 Hun, (N, Y.) 333; Hitch v.
Davis, 3 Md. Ch. 266; Brown v. Brown, 18 (;onn. 414;
Pope v. Randolph, 13 Ala. 214; Carridine v. Collins,
7 S. & M. 428; Blakey v. Blakey, 9 Ala. 391; Hille-
brant v. Brewer, 6 Tex. 45; Powell v. Leonard, 9
Fla. 359.
512 Kent's Coin., 439.
62 Miller v. Jeffress, 4Gratt. 479.
3 Case v. Dennison, 9 R. I. 88.
54 56 Me. 324.
chest or box, in which valuable articles are
kept, which are capable of being taken into the
hand, and may be delivered by being passed
from hand to hand, is not a valid delivery of
such articles. The rule is that the delivery
must be as perfect and complete as the na-
ture of the articles will admit of. While a
constructive delivery may be sufficient for
large or cumbrous articles, it will not be suf-
ficient for small articles, capable of a more
perfect and complete delivery." In Bunn v.
Markham,15 the would-be donor had certain
bonds and notes brought out of his chest and
laid on his bed. He then caused them to be
sealed up in packages, the amount of the con-
tents written on them, with a statement "for
Mrs. C," "for Miss C." This being done,
he directed that they should be returned to
the chest, that the chest should be locked,
the keys sealed up, and the keys to be deliv-
ered to one J after his decease. The gift was
invalid for want of delivery. In Powell v.
Hellicar, 56 the donor told one A to take the
keys of his dressing case and box, containing
her watch and trinkets, and immediately on
her death to deliver the watch and trinkets to
the plaintiff. A acted accordingly, but it was
held that the gift was incomplete for want of
delivery. But in Smith v. Smith, 57 it was
ruled that the delivery of the key of a room
containing furniture was such a delivery of
possession of the furniture as to render a gift
causa mortis valid. Other cases may be re-
ferred to,58 but those cited plainly illustrate
the necessity of delivering the thing itself in
all cases when the nature of the thing admits
of such a delivery. Upon this question of de-
livery, and of delivery as distinguished from
possession, we quote as follows: "It is not
the possession of the donee, but the delivery
to him by the donor, which is material in a
donatio mortis causa; the delivery stands in
the place of nuncupation, and must accompa-
ny and form a part of the gift; an after ac-
quired possession of the donee is nothing;
and a previous and continuing possession,
though by the authority of the donor, is no
better. The donee, by being the debtor or
45 7 Taunton, 223.
66 26 Beavan, 261.
7 Str. 955.
58 Jones v. Shelby,Chan. Prec. 300; Faryuharson v.
Cave, 2 Colby, 356; Cooper v. Burr, 45 Barb. 9; Red-
del v. Dobree, 10 Sine. 246.
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bailee or trustee of the donor, in regard to
the subject of the gift, stands upon no better
footing than if the debt or duty were owing
from a third person. A debt or duty can not
be released by mere parol, without considera-
tion; and where there is nothing to surrender
by delivery, the only result is, that in such a
case, there can not be a donatio mortis causa;
and a release, without valuable consideration
therefor, must be by testament, or by some
instrument of writing which would be effect-
ual for the purpose inter vivos."
'59
It remains for us to notice that it has been
that until death the title to the subject of the
gift remains in the donor, and vests in donee
only at time of donor's death, having re-
lation back to the time of delivery. 60 Is it
not more correct to say that the title passes
to the donee at the time of delivery, and that
the title thus obtained is defeasible only on
the recovery of the donor, or on his express
revocation? While a gift inter vivos, having
been perfected by delivery is irrevocable, 61
a gift causa mortis may be revoked at any
time before the donor's death. 62
HENRY WADE ROGERS.
69 Miller v. Jeffress, 4 Gratt. (Va.) 480; and see
French v. Raymond, 39 Vt. 624.
60 Gass v. Simpson, 4 Coldw. (Tenn.) 288.
61 2Kent's Com., 440.
62 lb., 447.
PRESUMPTIONS OF LIFE, DEATH, AND
SURVIVORSH [P.
V.
We have been egregiously taken aback by
a discovery, made too late, indeed, but for-
tunately while yet there was an opportunity
for manifesting regret; so that, at all events,
we are better circumstanced than the good
people of Devon, who, in days when it was
difficult for even ill news to travel fast, only
learned the death of Queen Elizabeth after
the period of court mourning, too, had ex-
pired. It happens that, so resolved were we
to investigate the subject in hand with entire
independence (a characteristic of our papers
in general, that the mere cursory reader may
fail to realize), we announced, at the outset, a
determination not to consult the "elaborate
note" to Nepean v. Doe, in Smith's Leading
Cases-something, forsooth, we might find to
say that was not there forestalled-yet were
we diffident, and apprised the reader that
there he would acquire every additional in-
formation to supplement our shortcomings.
Who, indeed, but would have expected to find
there an exhaustive annotation on the subject?
Well, having now concluded our own re-
searches and discussion as to presumptions of
life and death (as to which, cf., also, the New
York Code), we have ventured, at last, not
without trepidation, to try and discover our
deficiencies by exploring the "elaborate
note." Nepean v. Doe begins at page 584
of the last edition, and from page to page we
proceeded till we arrived at 703. So climbs
the traveler the imposing stone stairways at
Persepolis-they lead to nothing; and alike
illusory was our exploration. In fact, as we
regretted to discover, the "elaborate note"
devotes to the subject only a few lines of a
single page; and the feast of logic and the
flow of law, so confidingly anticipated, proved
as vain as the viands of Eon, the Sorcerer of
Britany. If, then, our discussion of pre-
sumptions of life and death has been some-
what protracted, the result is a monograph
that may be found of practical utility in ref-
erence to a subject so often arising, as to
which we have mentioned no less than four
Irish cases (two of them before the Land
Commission) occurring within the last month;
and there is the less reason to apologize for
not terminating before, but rather, as we do,
like the miller, shutting the gates when the
grist is out. The remaining clause of our
theme relates to presumptions of survivor-
ship; and here, too, we shall have to note in
other systems of jurisprudence some sug-
gestive differences from our own, while curi-
ous and interesting indeed have been many of
the cases in which the question was involved.
But this is a branch of the matter that hag
elsewhere received considerable attention, so
that there is less reason for treatment so ex-
tensive as its wide scope would allow; and we
shall but say, with Montesquieu, when he be-
gins to treat of commerce, "the subject which
follows would require to be discussed more at
large, but the nature of this work does not
permit it. f wish to glide on a tranquil
stream, but I am hurried along by a torrent."
Last December, we learned that a case was
about to come before a Marseilles tribunal
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